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THE ESTRADA DOCTRINE AND
UNITED STATES POLICY

CHARLES L. COCHRAN*

When the government of a state is overthrown by illegal or uncon.
stitutional means and a de facto government accedes to power, the issue
is raised with outside states as to whether or not the new regime should
be accorded recognition. And, if the decision is made to extend recogni.
tion, how should it be accorded?
Most states when considering whether or not to extend recognition
have applied political considerations as well as legal criteria. There is
little uniformity in the practice of recognition since states are free to
apply the criteria in a way that most effectively advances their own
self-interest. Thus recognition is held to be essentially a political and not
a legal act, or rather, a political act with legal implications. Consistent

with the view that recognition is a political act is the generally accepted
position that there is no legal duty to recognize a new regime.
As a result, attempts to formulate a common basis for the recognition
of de facto governments have been very limited both in their scope and
their success. 1
Nevertheless, a proposal put forward in 1930 by H. E. Genaro
Estrada, the then Secretary of Foreign Relations of Mexico, for a uniform
policy is making an impressive resurgence. His proposal, known as the
Estrada Doctrine, made little impact outside Mexico for several decades
except for its being generally acknowledged as an unusual approach to
the problem.
The Estrada Doctrine was originally put forward by the Foreign
Minister of Mexico in reaction to the heavy-handed policies of recognition
employed by various administrations in the United States. His doctrine
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criticized the practice of recognition as an insult insofar as it implies
that judgment may be passed by other countries upon nations in which
a coup or revolution takes place. He wrote:
It is a well.known fact that some years ago Mexico suffered as
few nations have, from the consequences of that doctrine, which
allows foreign governments to pass upon the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the regime existing in another country, with the result that
situations arise in which the legal qualifications or national status
of governments or authorities are apparently made subject to the
opinion of foreigners.2
Accordingly, the government of Mexico instructed its Ministers that the
Mexican government would not issue declarations or grants of recognition
since that government regards it an insulting practice that offends the
sovereignty of other nations. Governments assumed an attitude of criticism
when they decided, favoraby or unfavorably, as to the legal qualifications
of foreign regimes.1
Estrada announced that Mexico would simply maintain or withdraw
its diplomatic agents as it deemed advisable concerning the governments
in question. Recognition in such a practice ceases to be an instrument
of policy since the decision is reached automatically. The Estrada doctrine
does this by treating revolutionary or unconstitutional changes of government no differently than normal governmental changes. That is, irregular
changes are treated as a normal change of leadership within the government, not as a change of the government itself. Mexico hoped that other
governments would follow its lead but only Panama and Nicaragua
adopted that general policy until very recently.
The United States, in contrast, has usually placed considerable
emphasis on the use of recognition as an instrument of policy. The
traditional position of the United States with respect to the recognition
of de facto governments in the Hemisphere has included legal criteria
as well as political considerations. In recent years the considerations
have included at least the following.
1. Whether the government is in de facto control of the territory
and in possession of the machinery of the state;
2. Whether it is administering the government with the assent
or consent of the people, without substantial resistance to its authority,
i.e., whether there is public acquiescence in the authority of the
government; and
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3. Whether the new government has indicated its willingness to
comply with its international obligations under treaties and inter.
national law.4
However, an examination of the United States practice of recognition
in this Hemisphere, beginning in 1968, reveals that none of the above
criteria has been applied, and instead the government has followed the
Estrada doctrine of "continuing relations" with the new de facto government. Since 1968 there have been ten irregular changes in government
in six different Latin American states. 5 In each case the Department of
State issued a statement during its weekly press conference in the aftermath
of a coup in which it was stated that diplomatic relations were continuing
and that the question of recognition did not arise. 6
The new policy has a great deal to recommend it, not the least
of which is the realization that the supposed advantages of the skillful
use of recognition prove to be very marginal when weighed against the
potential costs.
The major argument in support of the use of recognition as an
instrument of policy usually is that the extension of recognition at a
timely moment may help to stabilize a friendly de facto government, while
the prolonged withholding of recognition might weaken an unfriendly
one by helping to isolate it. At the very least, so the argument runs, it
can obtain concessions from hostile governments. For example, in Latin
America the United States has attempted to extract assurances that
military juntas would set a timetable for returning to a popularly elected
government in the future, and assurances that the new government would
respect the international obligations of the state.
The negative aspect of such a policy is that a quick extension of
recognition in an effort to stabilize a regime has the unfortunate effect
of identifying the United States with that regime, which does not necessarily serve our interests. This is particularly true if the regime involved
is an authoritarian conservative government. The result is often to arouse
suspicions that the United States, at minimum, encouraged the coup and
perhaps even aided it. A prompt recognition would feed those suspicions.
Perhaps more importantly, however, the withholding of recognition
has not been demonstrably successful in determining whether an unfriendly government lasts or not. And, at least in Latin America, the
United States government eventually recognizes the de facto government,
no matter how unsuccessful the attempts to gain concessions may have
been. And even if concessions have been obtained, there is, of course,
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no guarantee that the concessions would be honored after recognition
is granted.
And finally the policy of nonrecognition of a government with
whom we disagree serves to isolate the United States as much as the
non.recognized government. Thus communications between two govern.
ments are made even more difficult at the very time when every effort
should be made to facilitate an exchange of views. The lack of communications may cloud reality and increase mutual misunderstanding.
At the same time it encourages a policy of avoiding the reality of the
new situation, which is obviously damaging to a rational foreign policy.
Although the traditional concept of recognition has been that recognition does not imply the approval of a foreign government, the use of
recognition in an effort to directly serve foreign policy interests militates
against the concept of recognition as being neutral. Not surprisingly the
United States government has been plagued by the handicap of having
its recognition policy identified with a connotation of approval or disapproval.
The United States Senate even felt compelled to deny the implication
in a resolution in 1969 which stated:
• . . that it is the sense of the Senate that when the United States
recognizes a foreign government and exchanges diplomatic relations
with it, this does not of itself imply that the United States approves
7
of the form, ideology, or policy of that foreign government.
Technically that is correct and merely repeats acceptable theory, but
realistically the association of approval with recognition is unavoidable
when recognition is used in an effort to further foreign policy goals.
The adoption of the Estrada Doctrine does more to end the confusion
surrounding the connotations of recognition than any Senate resolution
ever could. It is ironic that the policy of "continuing relations" and treating irregular changes of governments as merely changes in personnel,
and not as a change in the government itself, has more advantages than
the use of recognition on a case by case approach. As Estrada suggested,
a government should not have its legality subject to the judgment of
foreigners.
The policy and its enthusiastic endorsement by Latin American governments signals the decline of the importance of recognition as a
political act on the international level.8 This would appear to be a step
forward in both law and diplomacy.
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NOTES
lDr. Carlos Tobar, the Foreign Minister of Ecuador, was one of the main
proponents of a policy of automatic non-recognition of governments which came
to power by revolution. This doctrine was incorporated into the General Treaty of
Peace and Amity of 1907. Text of the treaty in 1 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 186; 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. 229 (1908). The Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense of the Continent, meeting in Montevideo in 1943,
adopted a resolution which recommended that the American Governments which
had declared war on the Axis Powers, or had severed relations with them, withhold
recognition from new governments instituted by irregular means until consultations
among themselves could take place to determine whether the new government
complied with the inter-American commitments for the defense of the Continent.
10 Dept. of State Bulletin 20 (1944). In 1965, Resolution XXVI was included in
the Final Act of the Second Special Inter-American Conference held at Rio
de Janeiro, Brazil. The resolution provides for an informal procedure of consultation whenever the problem of the recognition of de facto governments arises. See
Res. XXVI, Second Special Inter-American Conference, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
November 17-30, 1965, Final Act (Pan American Union, 1965), p. 38; 60 A.J.!.L.
460 (1966).
2Boletin Oficial de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Estados Unidos
Mexicanos, Sept. 1930, Vol. LV, No. 9, p. 9, as translated in 25 Am. J.Int'l. L.
Supp. 203 (1931).
31bid.
42 Whiteman, Digest of International Law 72 (1963). Other factors considered
as appropriate include "the existence or nonexistence of evidence of foreign intervention in the establishment of the new regime; the political orientation of the
government and its leaders; evidence of intention to observe democratic principles,
particularly the holding of elections; the attitude of the new government toward
private investment and economic improvement." Ibid. p. 73.
5
Forcible changes in government occurred late in 1968 in Panama and Peru;
in 1969 in Brazil and Bolivia; and in 1970 in Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia.
Argentina and Bolivia both experienced coups once again in 1971. And Ecuador
had a forcible change in February 1972.
6

The closest the government came to a statement of recognition came in
the case of Bolivia in 1969 when a United States note "stated our wish to
reciprocate the Bolivian Government's intention, expressed in its note, to continue
and strengthen the friendly relations that exist between the two countries. This
action was taken after consultation with the other American Republics pursuant
to Resolution 26 of the 1965 Rio Conference." 61 Bulletin 378 (1969). Ordinarily
these statements have not been carried in the Department of State Bulletin since
late 1968. More typical was the statement of John F. King of the State Department
to the press after the change in the military junta in Argentina in 1970 when
he said "that the change of leadership does not give rise to a question of
recognition: as there is no basic discontinuity in the military Government of
Argentina." The New York Times, June 13, p. 62 (1970).
7

91st Congress, 1st session S. Res. 205, 1969.

$At least the following Latin American states have begun using the Estrada
Doctrine in the last several years: Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. It is likely that it will be
universally applied throughout the Americas in the near future.

